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Abstract
We employ a structural gravity approach to analyse the impact
of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) and other policies on bilateral foreign direct investment (FDI).
We use the UNCTAD global database on bilateral FDI stocks and
flows. To control for the heterogeneous nature of PTAs we employ two
different indicators of PTA depth. We find that on average signing
a PTA increases bilateral FDI stocks by around 30%. Nevertheless,
we also find that ‘deeper’ or comprehensive PTAs (e.g. including pro-
visions on investment, public procurement and intellectual property
rights provisions) do not have a significantly different impact than sign-
ing regular PTAs. Belonging to the EU single market, on the other
hand, has a strong impact and increases bilateral FDI by around 135%,
and signing a BIT has an effect that is comparable to signing a PTA.
1 Introduction
We estimate the potential impact of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) –
and other bilateral policies that affect trade and investment– on the bilateral
FDI stocks and flows between the countries signing these agreements. Our
key results are based on a structural gravity model of FDI that is applied to
bilateral FDI data from UNCTAD (2014), while controlling for the presence,
heterogeneity and depth of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), and other
time-varying bilateral policies.
Starting in the 1990s, the world economy has experienced a large increase
in the number of PTAs, and also in their ‘depth’ – measured by the number
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of their operative provisions.1 While stimulating bilateral trade is the main
focus of most PTAs, recent preferential trade agreements increasingly con-
tain provisions on bilateral investment between member states. However,
the impact of PTAs on the magnitude of foreign direct investments is not
straightforward. Trade and FDI can either complement or substitute each
other, depending on the investment motivation (i.e. horizontal, vertical),
the specific industry and on the way in which the FDI provisions are shaped
in the PTA. From a theoretical point of view, horizontal FDI –where firms
replicate domestic activities in a foreign country– are associated with FDI
substituting for trade. Thus, in the presence of horizontal FDI, PTAs are ex-
pected to decrease FDI flows. On the other hand, vertical FDI –where firms
split activities between different geographical regions– creates a complemen-
tary relationship between trade, PTAs and FDI (cf. Markusen, 2002). More
recently, and in part due to the expansion and complexity of global value
chains (GVCs), other motives for FDI have been identified. For instance,
export-platform FDI where MNEs produce to export to third markets (Han-
son et al., 2005; Ekholm et al., 2007), while Yeaple (2003) classifies mixed
motives as ‘complex FDI’. Baldwin and Okubo (2014) develop the concepts
of ‘horizontal-ness’ and ‘vertical-ness’ to systematically classify these more
complex forms of FDI. Horizontal-ness is related to large shares of local
sales, while vertical-ness is associated with large shares of local sourcing
of intermediates.2 The links between trade and FDI, especially the role of
complementarity (vertical-ness) and substitutability (horizontal-ness), most
probably differ by industry. Hence, the industry composition of bilateral
trade and FDI is also likely to affect how PTAs impact bilateral FDI.
There has also been an increasing gap between the refinement of theoret-
ical FDI models and the availability of bilateral FDI data. The motivation
or purpose of the investments is mostly not revealed, and it can only be
inferred in an indirect way. Industry decomposition of bilateral FDI is only
possible for a very small number of countries.3 Even the compilation of a
1See for example, Dür et al. (2014), Hofmann et al. (2017), and Miroudot and Rigo
(2019).
2Combining these concepts Baldwin and Okubo (2014) create a two dimensional space
that accommodates for all FDI motives and distinguish six main FDI motives: pure hor-
izontal, pure vertical, pure export-platform, local assembly (tariff-jumping), resource ex-
traction and networked FDI (global value chains).
3Alfaro and Charlton (2009) identify between vertical and horizontal FDI flows by em-
ploying the implicit information in national input-output tables. An alternative database,
which has information at the industry level and has been used in some papers to estimate
FDI gravity models is the fDiMarkets database (www.fdimarkets.com) of the Financial
Times. However, this database has two main limitations: it only reports announced (in-
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consistent set of total bilateral FDI data between country pairs and at world
level is a difficult task (IMF, 2003). It is common that two partner countries
report different bilateral FDI values. Thus, a detailed reconciliation of the
data and a compilation methodology is required. In this study we employ
such a compilation, done by the UNCTAD (2014) database, which provides
bilateral data on inward and outward FDI flows and stocks.4
Since we cannot separate the FDI data between horizontal and vertical
FDI, the expected relation between PTAs, trade and FDI remains an empiri-
cal question. Bergstrand and Egger (2007) test a model with three countries
with export and FDI and they find that regional integration has a positive
trade effect, but a negative effect on FDI. This suggests a substitutability
relation between trade and FDI. Other studies that employ panel data with
a larger set of countries, find the opposite results (Daude et al., 2003; Chen,
2009; Osnago et al., 2017; Anderson et al., 2019, 2020). The latter studies
find empirical support for a complementary relation between trade and FDI,
which might well include the creation or expansion of global value chains via
PTAs.5 The analytical framework of our own paper is closest to Anderson
et al. (2019), in which they develop a structural gravity module for bilateral
FDI as part of a larger general equilibrium model. However, there are four
important differences between our paper and theirs. First, our paper fully
focuses on the direct impact of PTAs on bilateral FDI using a partial equi-
librium model, whereas they want to obtain the general-equilibrium effects
of PTAs on welfare.6 Secondly, we allow for the possibility that the rela-
tive FDI friction costs, i.e. the multilateral resistance terms with respect
to FDI, may differ from the bilateral trade-costs frictions. In Anderson
et al. (2019), the multilateral resistance terms are exclusively based on the
bilateral trade-costs frictions. Following Bergstrand and Egger (2007) and
Bergstrand and Egger (2010) both trade and FDI flows are driven by a ‘com-
stead of actual) investments and it only has information on green-field investment rather
than on total FDI. These serious database limitations do not allow for the country-wide
analysis we conduct in this paper.
4In particular, our main estimations employ the inward FDI stock data, which fluctu-
ates less and is in general more reliable than year-to-year FDI flow data. Nonetheless, we
also use inward FDI flows to assess the robustness of our results.
5Osnago et al. (2017), in particular, test the effect of deep PTAs on vertical FDI, and
not surprisingly, they find a positive relation. Like our paper, they also focus on the depth
of PTAs. However, we use a global database that includes both horizontal and vertical
bilateral FDI.
6The aim of the Anderson et al. (2019, 2020) papers is to obtain the PTAs’ general
equilibrium effects through trade and FDI effects on real income. We want to focus on the
effect of PTAs on FDI and we are not concerned with the trade nor the general equilibrium
effects that translate into welfare changes.
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mon process’. According to these authors, this implies that including trade
flows as explanatory variables in a (partial equilibrium) gravity equation for
FDI flows (or vice versa) is a serious mis-specification of the estimations and
it is likely to create an endogeneity bias. Therefore, we do not use trade
flows in our FDI gravity estimations. Employing only FDI data is sufficient
for our purposes to assess whether PTAs have a significant impact on bilat-
eral FDI patterns. Thirdly, we allow for the heterogeneity (depth) of PTAs,
while they only include a dummy variable for the presence of any PTA. The
fourth and final difference is that we generate a larger number of sensitivity
analyses to confirm the robustness of the effect of PTAs on FDI.
The contribution of this paper is that we present a stand-alone partial
equilibrium model explaining bilateral FDI patterns. We empirically esti-
mate the sign and magnitude of the effect that preferential trade agreements
have on FDI, conditional on the depth of the PTA and the presence of other
bilateral or multilateral policies –e.g. being member of the EU single mar-
ket, the presence of a bilateral investment treaty. We find that PTAs have
a significant and positive effect on bilateral FDI of around 30%. This effect
is slightly larger (35%) for the deepest PTAs, but this result is not statis-
tically different from just having any PTA –irrespective of its depth– and
it is not robust in many alternative specifications. Therefore, an important
finding of this paper is that we do not find that signing a comprehensive
PTA has an empirically larger effect than just signing a ‘shallow’ PTA. On
the other hand, we find that country-pairs that belong to the EU single
market experience a very substantial increase in bilateral FDI of around
135%. Therefore, we argue that it is crucial to control for the EU single
market, when estimating the impact of deep PTAs. Otherwise, the effect
of deep PTAs (when assuming that the EU single market is a deep PTA)
is overstated. Finally, we find that the sign and magnitude of the average
PTA effect, of being member of the EU single market, and of participating
in a bilateral investment treaty (BIT), are robust to different econometric
specifications. Indirectly, these results can be interpreted as pointing to a
higher relative importance of vertical over horizontal FDI, by associating
the trade-cost reductions of PTAs to the nature of the PTA-FDI relation.
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we survey the theoret-
ical background linking PTAs with FDI. Section 3 explains our analytical
framework and econometric specification. The data is presented in Section
4 and our main structural gravity results are shown in Section 5. In Section
6 we run several sensitivity analysis and we conclude in Section 7.
4
2 Theoretical background
Reviewing the literature on FDI determinants, Blonigen (2005) remarks:
‘Ideally, the FDI literature would have an established model and empirical
specification that lays out the primary long-run determinants of FDI loca-
tion’. He concludes however that such a model does not yet exist. Given
the success of the gravity trade model one wonders why it has not yet be-
come part of the standard empirical toolkit for the analysis of international
patterns in bilateral FDI. In a recent publication, Allen et al. (2020) gener-
alise the gravity trade model by unifying a large set of trade and geography
models, showing that the properties of models within this framework de-
pend crucially on the value of two gravity constants (aggregate supply and
demand elasticities). While their publication carries the title ‘Universal
Gravity’, they do not extend their theory to FDI. This might not be a co-
incidence. In this context, Blonigen (2005) again asserts: ‘As with trade
flows, a gravity specification actually fits cross-country data on FDI reason-
ably well. However, there is no similar paper to Anderson and van Wincoop
(2003) that lays out a tractable model that specifically identifies gravity
variables as the sole determinants of FDI patterns’. The gravity model has
mainly been used in empirical studies on FDI without a real theory that
predicts a gravity-like pattern.7
On the other side of the spectrum there are new theories for explain-
ing the relations between trade, FDI and the operations of multinational
corporations. Yet, here again we hit the gap between the refinement of
theoretical models and the availability of bilateral direct investment data.
Despite the fact that they predict gravity-like patterns, these new mod-
els are too complex and data-demanding for testing with actual data, and
therefore only allow calibrated exercises. For instance, several recent studies
on FDI (Bergstrand and Egger, 2007, 2010; Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare,
2013; Anderson et al., 2019, 2020) have tried to widen the scope of analysis
by explaining trade and FDI in the same models, e.g. by discussing the
trade versus FDI substitution effects. FDI is linked with capital accumu-
lation, economic growth and also with trade. But to try and understand
these phenomena in an integrated model leads into a quagmire of nested
causal relations. Anderson et al. (2019) use a calibrated model for a tenta-
tive analysis of the dynamic interaction of FDI, capital accumulation, trade
and GDP growth in 89 countries. The FDI equation forms a sub-system
7(Cf. Brainard, 1997; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004; Braconier et al., 2005; Kleinert and
Toubal, 2010; Davies and Kristjansdottir, 2010).
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of their overall model, so it cannot be used as a stand-alone explanation of
bilateral FDI patterns. In a simpler setting – using a 3-country, 3-factor,
2-goods model– Bergstrand and Egger (2007, 2010) study the interaction of
FDI flows with trade in final and intermediate goods, but also do not obtain
a closed-form gravity model for FDI. They find some indications for sub-
stitution between trade and FDI using a calibrated model to fit the data.8
Similarly, Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) present a more sophisti-
cated theoretical model for joint analysis of the interaction between trade
and different multinational strategies. They also show how this interaction
impacts the economic gains from economic openness. This model was later
expanded to an even more comprehensive economic model that could also
explain domestic innovation investment (Arkolakis et al., 2018). Although
these large models offer a coherent and often inspiring overview of the current
research areas, the empirical testing of their central theoretical predictions
has become problematic because of their comprehensiveness. In a method-
ological study on the assessment of causality relations, Pearl (2009) argues
that large integrated model structures are difficult to falsify, because they
rest on many parameters and behavioural assumptions for which no direct
measurement or other empirical data is available.9 This makes it difficult
to design and implement unambiguous empirical falsification tests. A key
empirical issue is the identification of the causal mechanisms in such large
models Lewbel (2019). An increasingly common practise is to render such
large models some plausibility by running calibrated data exercises. Because
large models offer ample opportunity to over-fit the data, the results of such
calibration exercises must be regarded with caution.
In this paper we take a different approach. We explain world-wide bilat-
eral FDI patterns by the smallest possible model. We deliberately opt for a
partial equilibrium model that explains the main push and pull factors for
FDI and that also accounts for absolute and relative bilateral FDI frictions.
Absolute FDI frictions can be formed by explicit restrictions on incoming
FDI. Legal and statutory restrictions are a form of absolute FDI frictions,
because they create a negative constraint on firm-level optimising behaviour.
Relative FDI frictions also account for other economic policy elements that
can make FDI less or more attractive (profitable), both in the host country
and in the origin country, when compared to all other countries. Most push
and pull factors are directly or indirectly linked to GDP, which represents a
8Bergstrand and Egger (2007) do calibrated exercises on the interaction between trade
and FDI, because their model specification does not allow full empirical testing.
9This also holds for Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2013) and Arkolakis et al. (2018).
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country’s economic mass. This model specification means that we do not test
the interrelation between PTAs, trade and FDI. This avoids the endogeneity
bias related to trade and FDI flows being generated by a common process
that can mis-specify the estimations (cf. Bergstrand and Egger, 2007, 2010).
Our model builds on the knowledge capital or knowledge-capital interpre-
tation of FDI.10 FDI is assumed to be comparable with trade in technology
services. A given stock of knowledge capital (e.g. patents, blueprints, man-
agement skills, business model and brands) can be used simultaneously in
more than one country, on a non-rival basis. The value of the knowledge
capital increases when it can be ‘leased’ to other countries in the form of
FDI. Both the use of foreign knowledge capital in the form of incoming
FDI, and the size of the origin countries’ stock of ‘leasable’ knowledge cap-
ital (outgoing FDI) are proportional to GDP. Our model takes the current
and past distribution of economic masses (GDP) of both origin and host
countries as an exogenous input. The amount of bilateral FDI rises as abso-
lute and relative FDI frictions diminish. The incidence and depth of PTAs
could lower both absolute and relative FDI friction costs, and thus increase
bilateral FDI between the member countries. We test for this hypothesis,
while controlling for the presence of other shocks in bilateral FDI frictions:
EU membership and the presence of bilateral investment treaties.
3 Analytical framework
This section provides details on the structural gravity model for FDI, our
quantitative strategy, and the precise empirical specifications that we em-
ploy.
3.1 Theoretical gravity model for FDI
Our FDI gravity model is related to the modelling approach developed by
Anderson et al. (2019, 2020). Nonetheless, there are important differences,
as was already mentioned in the introduction. The FDI gravity module in
Anderson et al. (2019) is part of a larger general equilibrium model that
aims to assess the effects that PTAs through trade, FDI and capital accu-
mulation have on welfare. The model has an aggregated setup, with total
trade and total FDI. The issue of complementary (vertical-ness) and sub-
stitutability (horizontal-ness) of trade-FDI links is only touched in a crude
calibrated simulation in which they compare a world with and without FDI.
10Developed inter alia by Markusen (2002) and McGrattan and Prescott (2009, 2010).
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Their model is restrictive by assuming that the relative FDI friction costs
(multilateral resistance terms) are the same as the relative trade friction
costs. Finally, their modelling of PTA membership by a binary dummy is
not adequate for our aim.
We adapt the FDI module of Anderson et al. (2019) so that it can be
used as a stand-alone partial-equilibrium model for exploring the direct im-
pacts of different PTA designs on bilateral FDI. The largest restriction of our
model is that we totally ignore bilateral trade flows and focus exclusively on
bilateral FDI patterns. The model is based on the knowledge-capital inter-
pretation of FDI, where this type of capital assumes proprietary knowledge
that can be used on a non-rival basis in several locations. Firms increase
the value of their proprietary knowledge capital by ‘leasing’ it to other coun-
tries in the form of FDI. Flows of knowledge capital are to a large extent
intangible and therefore difficult to measure. We use the stock of bilateral
FDI as a proxy for the flow of knowledge (technology) capital between two
countries. Anderson et al. (2019) implicitly assume that FDI frictions are
the same as trade frictions, but there is no evidence for this assertion and
we therefore concentrate on FDI frictions. In our model, the free flow of
knowledge capital across national borders is hindered by absolute and rel-
ative FDI frictions. Absolute FDI frictions are legal and statutory barriers
that a country imposes on the access of foreign FDI capital. This includes
total bans, negative lists that specify restrictions to the activity of multina-
tionals in specific industries, protection of national champions, or any other
access-related policy measures. Relative FDI frictions refer to opportunity
costs of operation in a host country j compared to the operating costs in
all other potential alternative location choices. It includes a host of op-
erational costs, such as distance (transport), infrastructure, communication
(language differences), legal system (enforceability of contracts), government
characteristics (efficiency, degree of business-mindedness, stability), labour
costs, corporate tax rate, corruption, and security (insurance and contin-
gency costs). The absolute FDI frictions dominate and precede the relative
FDI friction by setting the negative constraints that frame the choice possi-
bilities for FDI location choice. For our model, it is important to note that
PTAs can have an impact on both absolute and relative FDI frictions.
We move on to the core of the formal model.11 The value of bilateral
FDI originating from country i and hosted in country j is represented by
FDIstockij . It is positively affected by the size of the country of origin (Yi),
because larger economies tend to invest more in knowledge capital. The
11For further details, see Annex A.1 where we derive the full model.
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bilateral FDI stock is also positively impacted by the size of the destina-
tion country (Yj), because larger economies have more consumers, firms
and industries that can absorb foreign FDI technology. Thus, Yi and Yj are
proxies for the economic mass of the origin and destination country. Both
are proxied using real GDP values. The free flow of FDI is hindered firstly by
absolute FDI frictions. If Êij = 1, country j is fully open for entry of knowl-
edge capital from country i, and if Êij = 0, no knowledge capital originating
from country i is admitted. FDI decisions also depend on relative FDI cost
frictions that reflect the opportunity costs of choosing one particular FDI
destination country versus all other countries. For origin country i, Pi repre-
sents the average of inward relative friction costs in all destination countries,
weighted by their economic mass. Larger Pi makes FDI less attractive and
it will lower the volume of bilateral investment. Relative friction costs may
also arise in the origin countries themselves, e.g. via extraterritorial regu-
lations for firms that have outward FDI. For the destination countries this
may matter, and it will lower inward FDI from such countries. Therefore,
we also account for the factor Πj , which stands for the average of outward
friction costs of all countries that invest in destination country j.
The aforementioned elements are the main determinants of bilateral FDI
stocks. Our equation for bilateral FDI has the ’classical’ structural gravity
form as defined in Head and Mayer (2014):12
FDIstockij = Êij
–Yi
Pi
—Yj
Πj
(1)
The parameters – > 0 and — > 0 are both gravity proportionality factors.
They indicate how strong the bilateral FDI stocks react to the economic
masses of, respectively, the origin and the destination country.13 Finally,
Pi and Πj are the FDI-based multilateral resistance terms of the structural
gravity trade model. These aggregators normalise the (relative) FDI friction
costs of each country pair with the average friction costs in other countries.
The inward multilateral resistance (MR) term (Pi) uses the CES constant
elasticity of substitution ‡ for a consistent aggregation and averaging of all
national FDI friction costs, after weighing them by the relative economic
size of each country.14 Pi is the time-variant MR term from the perspective
12Time indexes are suppressed in this representation.
13Without loss of generality we assume these factors to be the same for all origin and
destination countries.
14In particular, we use σ > 1, which results in all countries having a preference for
variety of products and knowledge capital by country of origin.
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of origin country i, and averaging across all potential partner countries:
Pi =
S
U Nÿ
j=1
A
zij
Πj
B(1−σ)
Yj
Y
T
V
1
1−σ
(2)
in which zij is a measure for the FDI cost frictions that affect FDI originat-
ing from country i and going to country j. These costs may be direction-
specific –i.e. non-symmetric: zij may differ from zji. Some cost elements
may be symmetric like the effects of distance, the costs of having different
languages, or even the costs of having different legal systems. Other costs
elements, however, may be non-symmetric like the additional business costs
due to national policies that are specific for destination country j. All fric-
tion elements increase the costs of bilateral FDI, but the relevant question
is whether the investing firms have better alternative FDI locations. This
depends on two factors. Firstly, the term
zji
Πj
measures the relative friction
costs by normalising zij with the average cost aggregator Πj (i.e. the out-
ward MR term, which is explained below). If
zji
Πj
<1, the relative FDI friction
costs are less than average and may not form an obstacle for bilateral FDI,
but in the opposite case they do obstruct FDI. The second factor is the size
of country j’s economy, as measured by its relative economic mass (
Yj
Y
), in
which Y =
q
Yj , is world output or world GDP. The combination of both
elements decides whether a country is a preferred FDI location. A good
score on one element may compensate a bad score on the other element.
Countries that have the combination of a small economy and relatively high
FDI friction costs may expect the least FDI, while most FDI will go to large
countries with relatively low FDI friction costs.
The structural gravity model also accounts for differences in the policy-
related and geographical characteristics of each FDI origin. Such differences
may affect the willingness and behaviour of national firms to engage in
outward direct investment projects. Because the gravity model is all about
the proportionality between economic mass and the intensity of cross-border
transactions, we must also account for such frictional (disturbance) factors.
When we consider incoming FDI from the perspective of destination country
j, less bilateral FDI is expected per dollar of the origin country i’s GDP,
when country i has higher than average outward friction costs. The full FDI
gravity system, therefore, also holds the term Πj , representing the average
outward multilateral resistances for origin countries that invest in country
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j, which is aggregated in a similar way as in Equation 2:
Πj =
C
Nÿ
i=1
3
zji
Pi
4(1−σ) Yi
Y
D 1
1−σ
(3)
Equation 3 uses country i’s average inward MR terms Pi to normalise the
outward bilateral friction costs zji. Less bilateral FDI per dollar of origin
country i’s GDP may be expected when it has higher than average outward
friction costs (
zji
Pi
> 1). Again, this may be compensated if country i has
higher than average economic mass (Yi/Y¯ > 1).
15
The inward and outward multilateral resistance terms (Pi and Πj , re-
spectively) are theoretical constructs that capture general equilibrium ef-
fects, which usually are not directly observable. They allow to calculate
the relative FDI friction costs that together with absolute FDI barriers –
represented by the openness measure Êij– determine how much inward FDI
stocks a destination country is expected to receive from a particular origin
country. The inward MR terms can provide valuable policy-relevant infor-
mation. For instance, one could use the inward MR terms to identify those
national policies that could be most effective in attracting FDI inflows.16
Equations 1 to 3 define the core gravity model of FDI.17 The model
can be tested empirically on the basis of its predictions for bilateral FDI.
In particular, we expect that bilateral FDI should be positively related to
the GDP of origin and host countries. On the other hand, it should be
negatively affected by relative FDI friction costs, such as transportation
and communication costs (physical distance, lacking a common language,
lacking a common border), costs of having different legal and regulatory
regimes (lacking common institutions, no common history), and by having
other policy-made barriers to bilateral trade and FDI.
This leads us to the main empirical question for this study: how are
the FDI friction factors affected by the presence and the ‘depth’ of PTAs?
To answer this question we extend the model to formally derive testable
hypotheses. For the incidence of a common PTA membership we use the
dummy variable Dij that has the value of 1 when country i and country j
15Mutatis mutandis, the opposite holds for countries with lower than average outward
friction costs. For example, because they are neighbouring countries, or because they have
governments that stimulate foreign investments.
16In Kox and Rojas-Romagosa (2019) we further explore the empirical impact of in-
ward MRs on FDI flows and their relation with national policy variables. See Kox and
Rojas-Romagosa (2018) for an application to the Pacific Alliance and Kox (2018) for the
Philippines.
17More details on the derivation of the base model can be found in Appendix A.1.
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are part of the same PTA, and the value of 0 otherwise. For the depth of
the PTA we use the variable Qij , that may have h values (degrees of PTA
depth). We then expect negative partial differentials of bilateral access
variable Êij and the relative friction costs
zij
Πij
with respect to Dij and Qij .
Consequently, the model predicts positive partial differentials of FDIij with
respect to Dij and Qij .
18 To test the robustness of our estimations we
experiment with different PTA depth indexes and with different economic
integration indicators.19 With our gravity model we can empirically test the
following formal hypotheses:
1. Shared membership in any PTA increases FDI openness and/or lowers
relative FDI friction costs. Both effects increase bilateral FDI.
2. Shared membership of deeper PTAs increases FDI openness and/or
lowers relative FDI friction costs. Both effects increase bilateral FDI.
3. Deeper PTAs impact FDI openness, relative FDI friction costs and
bilateral FDI more than PTAs with average depth. 20
Finally, it is important to note that the introduction of a new PTA prob-
ably increases the relative FDI friction term (multilateral resistance term)
for non-member states. Thus, there could be FDI-diversion effects that gen-
erate relative decreases of bilateral FDI for non-member countries. These
effects should be stronger if large countries participate in the new PTA.
However, because these FDI-diversion effects are spread over many non-
member countries, it is probably only measurable if a proper counterfactual
is developed that keeps all other circumstances constant. This exercise is
beyond the scope of our study, and might require a full general equilibrium
approach.
3.2 Estimation of the structural gravity model
We have deliberately refrained from modelling more FDI specificities that
–according to the literature– also have an impact on FDI. Examples are
18The precise values for Qij depend on which specific PTA index we use.
19The current literature (i.e. Dür et al., 2014; Miroudot and Rigo, 2019; Hofmann et al.,
2017) finds that there is a host of qualitatively different provisions in trade agreements,
implying that there are alternative ways of ranking PTA depth. The PTA-depth databases
of Hofmann et al. (2017) and Dür et al. (2014) use depth levels derived from the number of
active provisions in a bilateral or multilateral agreement. Another way of interpreting the
PTA depth levels is to link it to Balassa’s classification of levels of economic integration
(Balassa, 1961).
20In the empirical section we find that in the DESTA database (Dür et al., 2014) that
has a depth range from 0 to 7, the average PTA depth is 3.7.
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the industry differences in foreign investment strategies (market-seeking,
resource-seeking, global value chains), biases due to tax routing of FDI
(Damgaard et al., 2019), or the firm-level interaction between investment
and trade strategies (e.g. Conconi et al., 2016). Such factors may cause
additional variance in bilateral FDI patterns. The key in the economet-
ric testing of our model is whether the main policy variables (i.e. PTAs
and BITs) remain significant despite the non-modelled, non-observed, or
even non-observable impacts on global bilateral FDI patterns. Our model
is therefore empirically testable and falsifiable. If, for whatever reason, we
do not find the predicted FDI patterns, the model must be rejected. This
creates a range of challenges that must be dealt with in the econometric
testing of the model:
• Impact factors for bilateral FDI at the level of individual country pairs,
known from the literature but not specified in the present model;
• Non-observed or even unknown impact factors that may be relevant
at the firm or/or country level;
• Additional country-pair time-varying policy shocks to bilateral FDI.
We account for PTAs, BTIs, and EU membership changes, but other
policies can have additional impacts;
• Confounding impact factors that affect both the dependent variable
(bilateral FDI) and some or all of the explanatory variables (e.g. PTA
endogeneity and tax routing of FDI), which may lead to biased econo-
metric results.21 There is sufficient empirical evidence that country
pairs with large bilateral trade flows are more likely than others to en-
gage in joint preferential trade agreements (cf. Baier and Bergstrand,
2007; Egger et al., 2011). This endogeneity effect of PTA could also
hold for bilateral FDI and BITs (cf. Bergstrand and Egger, 2013).
In what follows, we discuss how we deal with these important data-
related and econometric challenges, so that the gravity estimation is neither
biased nor inconsistent with its theoretical foundations.
First, in line with the recent literature we employ a Pseudo-Poisson max-
imum likelihood (PPML) estimator, because it effectively deals with zero bi-
lateral FDI flows and accounts for the presence of heteroskedasticity in FDI
data (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). We are careful to distinguish sharply
21See Pearl (2009) and Lewbel (2019) for methodological backgrounds.
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between real zero FDI (flows or stocks) and missing (or non-reported, sup-
pressed) data. However, the quality of the data on bilateral FDI leaves more
uncertainty on this issue than holds for the case of, for instance, bilateral
trade.
Second, we also follow the best practice of using country-pair-fixed effects
to account for any unobservable time invariant FDI barriers. Using pair-
fixed effects has been proven to be a better measure of the bilateral costs
than the standard set of gravity variables (Egger and Nigai, 2015; Agnosteva
et al., 2014). In addition, the standard gravity equation applied to bilateral
trade flows points to an endogeneity issue regarding the relation between
PTAs and trade. PTAs are more likely between partners that already have
intense trade relations. This endogeneity problem will also be present when
dealing with FDI flows. Several methods can be used to account for this
issue (see for example, Egger et al., 2011; Anderson et al., 2020). In this
respect, we follow the common practice of using country-pair fixed effects,
which can also deal with the endogeneity of PTAs by accounting for the
observable and unobservable linkages between the endogenous trade policy
covariate and the error term (Yotov et al., 2016). In addition, the use of only
one PTA variable may still give biased results if there are simultaneous other
pairwise time-varying factors that could play a role in determining FDI. This
is why we combine our PTA indicators with other policy variables such as
bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
Third, we use origin-time and destination-time fixed effects to properly
account for multilateral resistance terms in panel data gravity estimations
(Olivero and Yotov, 2012). The country of origin generates the outward FDI
stock and the destination country the inward FDI stock. The origin-time
and destination-time fixed effects also absorb the country size variables (Yit
and Yjt) from the structural gravity system in equations (1-3), in addition
to all other observable and unobservable time-varying country-specific char-
acteristics, including different national policies, institutions, and exchange
rates (Yotov et al., 2016).
Fourth, we use panel data, which leads to improved estimation efficiency,
and more importantly, allows the use of the country-pair fixed-effects and
the origin-time and destination-time fixed effects methods mentioned above.
Fifth, we must account for the effect of non-discriminatory domestic
policies. Even if they are not explicitly discriminating foreign trade and
investment, they still are likely to affect the level and pattern of international
trade and investment (Kox and Lejour, 2005). To estimate the effects of
non-discriminatory policies we follow Heid et al. (2015), which estimate the
structural gravity model using both international and intra-national trade
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flows. The same reasoning may apply to FDI flows, and we assume that non-
discriminatory policies also influence domestic capital stocks and inward FDI
stocks. Yotov et al. (2016) mention some further reasons why the gravity
estimations should include international and intra-national (domestic) data.
It provides a theoretically consistent identification of the effects of bilateral
policies and a bias-free estimation of the effects of PTAs on FDI. Moreover,
it resolves the ‘distance puzzle’ by accounting for both foreign and domestic
distances.
Sixth, since trade (and FDI) flows do not respond immediately to trade
policy changes, some authors have criticised the use of panel-data estima-
tions over consecutive years (Trefler, 2004). However, using bilateral FDI
stocks as our main dependent variable lessens this concern, since stock data
is much less volatile than trade and FDI flows. We test the sensitivity of our
results by employing FDI stock data grouped in 2-year, 3-year and 4-year
averages.22
Seventh and final, there is significant heterogeneity between PTAs (Horn
et al., 2010). Thus, using a simple PTA dummy variable could bias the esti-
mated effects of PTAs on FDI flows. Deep PTAs usually include investment
provisions and other provisions that might ease FDI inflows, in this might
impact a different effect than in shallow PTAs. We apply several PTA depth
indicators, which are detailed in Section 4.
3.3 Main regression equation
Based on the best practices explained above, the structural model of equa-
tions (1) to (3) is then applied to a data panel (with time t) using the
following econometric specification for our baseline regression:
FDIijt = exp [“1POLijt + µit + µjt + µij ] + ‘ijt (4)
where FDIijt is the inward FDI stock from origin country i to the country
of destination j in period t. POLijt is a time-variant vector of bilateral pol-
icy variables (e.g. PTAs, BITs and EU membership). µit are time-varying
origin-country fixed effects (dummy variables) that control for the outward
multilateral resistance terms and countries’ output shares. µjt are time-
varying destination-country fixed effects that account for the inward multi-
lateral resistance terms and total expenditure. µij are the set of country-pair
fixed effects that absorb all time-invariant gravity covariates from zij along
with any other time-invariant determinants of FDI friction costs that are
22In the case of FDI flows we do use 4-year averages as our main dependent variable.
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not observable. Finally, ‘ijt is a combined error term. Equation (4) is our
main estimating equation.
There can be several country-specific time-varying policy variables that
might also affect bilateral FDI. Therefore, we employ additional policy vari-
ables –alternative economic integration indicators, currency unions, BITs,
and other policy indices. Using these additional policy variables together
with our PTA indicators, allows us to check that the effect of PTAs is not
indirectly reflecting the effect of other variables. In addition, by combin-
ing several policy variables, we can also identify which additional policy
variables might be relevant to explain bilateral FDI values.
As an alternative and to test the robustness of our results, we also use
the standard gravity equation:
FDIijt = exp [“1POLijt + “2Cij + µit + µjt] + ‘ijt (5)
where Cij is the vector of time-invariant bilateral control variables (i.e. bilat-
eral distance, contiguity, common language and colonial ties). By including
these bilateral time-invariant covariates, we can no longer use the country-
pair fixed effects in equation (4). Hence, by comparing both specification,
we can observe how important the unobservable and not identified FDI de-
terminants and barriers are to our estimations.23
As explained before, we test a partial-equilibrium FDI model, were only
the bilateral stocks change after a change in the bilateral policy variables.
The time-varying multilateral resistance terms in the gravity model take
account of the changes in each country’s relative opportunity cost for FDI
investing. It is important to stress again that the focus is on the direct
effects on FDI. However, a partial analysis cannot capture all knock-on
welfare effects of more FDI via domestic consumption prices and production
efficiency. For example, if a PTA creates a more integrated market area
(via deeper PTAs and FDI inflows) it may also attract more FDI from non-
member countries. These additional effects can only be identified through a
general equilibrium analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
4 Data
4.1 FDI bilateral data
For structural gravity analysis we need bilateral data. Most data sources
on FDI only provide inflows or outflows of one country from/to the Rest of
23In addition, by not using country-pair fixed effects, we can not effectively control for
the endogeneity of signing PTAs with existing FDI stocks.
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the World. Moreover, the gravity analysis requires the information of the
full world FDI matrix –although some simplification is possible by grouping
together minor countries/regions. Only a few sources offer consistent time
series for bilateral FDI flows. We use UNCTAD’s Bilateral FDI Statistics
(UNCTAD, 2014), which provides systematic FDI data for over 200 coun-
tries, covering inflows, outflows, inward stocks (‘instock’) and outward FDI
stocks (‘outstock’). The UNCTAD data is collected mainly from national
sources when available. If not, it is complemented with data from partner
countries (mirror data) and with data from other international organisa-
tions.24 The data are available for four FDI categories: inflows, outflows,
instock and outstock. This database has available information for the years
2001 to 2012, and all the data are in US$ millions. Importantly, the database
distinguished between zero flows and missing data, which provides valuable
information for our analysis.
Bilateral FDI stocks measure the magnitude of the use that a host coun-
try makes of knowledge capital from a particular origin country.25 Like
Anderson et al. (2020), our dependent variable in the main specification is
the inward FDI stock data from UNCTAD, which is also the FDI category
with most data availability. When inward stock is missing or zero, we use
the ‘mirror’ outward stock data, if available. As a result our compiled UNC-
TAD database consists of 203 countries, 12 years (2001 to 2012), around 78
thousand total observations and eight thousand total country-pairs with and
average number of observations by country-pair of around nine. There are
26762 zero values, which represent 31% of the total number of observations.
Note that there is a small proportion (less than 3%) of stock values in
the UNCTAD database that are negative. This issue can be explained by
looking into the three elements included in the FDI flow and stock values:
1. Greenfield direct investments/disinvestments
2. Changes in intra-company loans or leases or franchise fees between
holding and subsidiaries
3. Changes in valuation of foreign subsidiaries (either changes in equity
24For instance, the OECD’s International Direct Investment Statistics database and the
IMF’s FDI data.
25As in Anderson et al. (2019, 2020), we use bilateral FDI stock data, which are more
widely available and reliable than FDI flow data, and which is close to the knowledge
capital stock concept. We use FDI flow data as part of our robustness tests, but because
it has a large degree of volatility over time we use 3- and 4-year averages instead of yearly
data.
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valuation or appreciation/depreciation of real investment stock, or ac-
quisition changes of local minority-owned subsidiaries (<10% owned)
In particular, the last two elements can result in negative flows and even
stocks. Using the average data over two, three and four years solves part of
this problem. However, since it is not practically or theoretically consistent
to have negative FDI stock values, we set the remaining negative values
equal to zero.26
It is known from the literature that bilateral FDI stocks may be dis-
turbed by tax routing and other measurement issues (Beugelsdijk et al.,
2010; Damgaard et al., 2019). Tax routing refers to bilateral FDI that may
be ‘phantom FDI’ traffic, which is attracted either by countries with low tax
rates (tax havens), or by countries that facilitate special-purpose-enterprises
(letter-box companies) that are frequently used in private or corporate tax
evasion. Damgaard et al. (2019) estimate that most of the world’s ‘phantom’
FDI is in a small group of offshore centres: Luxembourg ($3.8 trillion), the
Netherlands ($3.3 trillion), Hong Kong SAR ($1.1 trillion), British Virgin
Islands ($0.8 trillion), Bermuda ($0.8 trillion), Singapore ($0.8 trillion) and
the Cayman Islands ($0.7 trillion). In recent years, the OECD is asking
member states to provide FDI statistics that distinguish between the imme-
diate and the ultimate FDI destination country. However, so-far these data
are only available for a small country sample and a few years. In our study
we assess the impact of tax routing on inward of FDI stocks by doing sepa-
rate regressions for country samples with and without the countries that are
central in corporate tax evasion. This can only be a rough indicator because
countries like The Netherlands, Singapore and Hong Kong are themselves
large enough to attract much inward FDI, even without tax facilities.
One or our econometric strategy choices (cf. Section 3.2) is to compare
outward FDI with investing in domestic capital stocks. To obtain the do-
mestic capital stock data, we employ the 2019 version of the IMF Investment
and Capital Stock Dataset (IMF, 2019). IMF gives these real investment and
capital stock series in constant international dollars using constant (2011)
PPP exchange rates in order to make the series comparable across coun-
tries. These values were converted into current US dollars to make them
comparable with the UNCTAD-based FDI data.27
26Negative valuations may be regarded as corrections of the value of FDI stocks of past
years, and therefore do not refer to the actual period of time. Negative FDI stocks would
also be inconsistent with a gravity model, because a negative FDI stock value could only
arise in the case that at least one of both economic masses (Yj , Yi) is negative.
27For this we use the PPP to nominal US$ conversion factors from the World Develop-
ment Indicators.
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4.2 The DESTA database
The main policy variable we analyse is the presence and depth of PTAs. In
particular, we use the Design of Trade Agreements (DESTA) database (Dür
et al., 2014). This database has systematically collected data on more than
700 agreements, which are then codified to identify the presence of active
PTAs for country dyads. It also ranks each PTA by the presence of seven
different provisions: full tariff reductions (with few exceptions), provisions
on common standards, services trade provisions, competition policy provi-
sions, provisions on public procurement, investment and intellectual prop-
erty rights (IPRs). Using these provisions DESTA generates a PTA depth
index that ranges from one to seven, depending on how many provisions are
present in each trade agreement.28
The most recent database version (May 2019) covers the time period
between 1948 and 2018.29 Since many of the initial ‘base’ agreements have
later been modified (by accessions, withdrawals, amendments, consolida-
tions, or are currently under negotiation), there are more than six thousand
entries in the database. Since this number refers to unique country pairs,
then we have more than one hundred thousand observations when we allow
each observation to have its dual country-pair.30
Some adjustments have been made to the original DESTA database.
The most important one relates to the EU, since DESTA does considers the
EU’s single market to have a depth index of five. This classification is based
on the contents of the European Economic Area agreement, but does not
account for other EU-wide non-trade agreements. However, the EU single
market provides broader and deeper economic integration than any existing
PTA. The EU’s single market is the largest project of economic integration
among sovereign states.31 It’s legal and institutional setting assures that
the EU single market provides substantially less friction for bilateral trade
and FDI than the deepest PTA. Therefore, initially we assume that all EU
28Note that the DESTA depth indicator is a ‘count’ indicator but not an accumulative
indicator. Hence, any PTA with two provisions, no matter which, will have a depth index
of two. Only depth-index seven includes all provisions.
29Retrieved from: https://www.designoftradeagreements.org/.
30For example, a German-Dutch treaty will only appear as DEU-NLD in DESTA, but
we also include its dual observation: NLD-DEU, so it can match are dual country dyads
from the FDI database.
31Among others, this is provided by the four fundamental principles of single market
–free movement of goods, capital, services, and labour, the customs union and common
external trade policy, the large number of EU-wide regulatory bodies, and the enforcement
of EU law through the European Court of Justice.
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country-pairs have the deepest PTA index (with value seven). Nevertheless,
our preferred specification is to separately distinguish the EU single market
integration institutions, which go well beyond any existing PTA, by using a
EU single-market dummy variable (EU-sm).32 Two additional adjustments
were made. First, each new EU member states automatically inherits the
past PTAs negotiated by the EU. Thus, upon the date of accession of each
new member state, we adjust the DESTA data to reflect that these new
member countries also are part of the previously negotiated EU PTAs. Sec-
ond, we correct the initial year of implementation for some treaties (i.e. the
Pacific Alliance, the Central America PTA and the EU-Central America
Association Agreement).
At the most general level, we use DESTA database to identify the pres-
ence of a PTA by using a dummy variable that is one if two countries in
a particular year are both members of the same PTA, and zero otherwise.
Next to that we employ the DESTA depth index as our main PTA depth
indicator.33 Finally, we also make dummy indices for each of the seven
provisions in the DESTA depth index, so that we can isolate which PTA
component is more important to explain FDI inflows.
Combining the UNCTAD bilateral FDI data with the DESTA database
provides us with more than one hundred thousand observations: around
8500 unique country-pairs for 12 years (2001-2012). As has been previously
documented (Dür et al., 2014; Miroudot and Rigo, 2019), the cumulative
number of active PTAs, as well as the depth of PTAs has been increasing
over time. For our sample period, Figure 1 shows an increase in the share of
active PTAs (from around 28% of total observations in 2001, to 40% in 2012).
We also observe that the PTA depth has experienced a less pronounced
increase, moving from a depth average of 3.6 in 2001 to 3.9 at the end of
the time interval.
— FIGURE 1 around here —
The DESTA depth index is a count index and the depth-levels one to six
may have different combinations of provisions. Table 1 shows the frequency
of different PTA depth combinations. First, we observe that around one-
third of all observations (and of all country-pairs) have an active PTAs
32We account for the year of accession of new member states: 2004 for ten new members
states, 2007 for Bulgaria and Romania, and 2014 for Croatia.
33When there is no DESTA information for a country dyad, or the treaty is not yet
implemented we then assign a value of zero to both the PTA dummy and the depth
indicator.
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during this period. When there is an active PTA, the most common depth
levels are one and seven (both with around 28% of total observations). When
we look at country-pairs, however, the most common depth level is seven
(29%), but this is driven by EU member states, since country-pairs within
the EU single market represent 21% of the total PTAs. Once we disregard
the country pairs in the EU single market, the most common depth level is
three (24%). The EU, moreover, is part of 2263 observations with an active
PTA (as at least one of the partners) and this represents 68% of all the active
PTAs during this period. Once excluding the country-pairs within the EU
single market, the most frequent depth levels for EU trade agreements are
three (30%) and seven (20%).
— TABLE 1 around here —
Finally, we look at the individual provisions that constitute the DESTA
depth index. We find that the standards provisions is the most common,
present in 88% of all PTAs, followed by full tariff reductions (73%). The ser-
vices, public procurement and competition provisions are present in around
half the PTAs, while the least common provisions are on IPRs (34%) and
investment (39%). Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the most frequent pro-
vision combinations by PTA depth level. There we observe that when only
one provision is present (depth 1), the standards provisions accounts for 70%
of the cases, with the full tariff reductions accounting for 23%. Since these
two provisions are the most common, it is not surprising that for PTAs with
two provisions, this combination (standards + full tariffs) accounts for 95%
of the cases. However, when three provisions are present, the most common
combination does not include them, and the combination with services, com-
petition and investment represents 29% of the cases. For PTAs with depth
level four, the most common combination is standards, full tariffs, services
and competition (80%). For PTA depth levels of five and six, the most
common combinations exclude IPRs, which is also the least common of all
the provisions.
4.3 Additional policy variables
In this section we describe additional policy variables that are used to com-
plement the DESTA database and test the sensitivity of our results. Hence,
apart from the widely used DESTA database, we also use the most recent
World Bank PTA depth database (Hofmann et al., 2017), and WTO’s Re-
gional Trade Agreements Database that is built on official notifications by
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member governments.34
4.3.1 World Bank horizontal depth PTA database
The World Bank (Hofmann et al., 2017) has also compiled a database that
includes 279 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed by 189 countries
and reported to the WTO between 1958 and 2015. The database builds on
the methodology developed by Horn et al. (2010). It explicitly reports if
each PTA includes any of up to 52 provisions on different policy areas and
the legal enforceability of each provision. In total, the database provides
information over 104 variables (52 provisions and, separately, their legal
enforceability).
Some of these provisions relate to policy areas that fall under the current
mandate of the WTO –referred to as ‘WTO plus’ (‘WTO+’) in the litera-
ture. This includes topics related to anti-dumping measures, export taxes,
customs regulations, technical barriers to trade (TBT) and sanitary and
phytosanitary standards (SPS). It also reports provisions outside the WTO
mandate –i.e. ‘WTO extra’ or ‘WTO-X’– which includes a wider range of
policy areas, such as investment provisions and environmental standards.
This rich source of information allows the construction of different PTA
depth indexes. Some are based on the type of provision (WTO+, or WTO-
X). Others use the concept of ‘core’ provisions (e.g. Baldwin, 2008; Damuri,
2012), which are considered to be the more significant or ‘core’ provisions
from an economic point of view. These include all the WTO+ provisions, in
addition to four WTO-X provisions (competition policy, investment, move-
ment of capital, and intellectual property rights protection).
To account for the depth of a PTA using the World Bank database we
use four indexes, which are based on the three original indexes developed in
Hofmann et al. (2017), plus an additional index:
• The first two indexes are the ‘total depth’ indexes, which are the simple
count of legally enforceable provisions included in a PTA (defined as
wb_tot_le) and the simple count of the 52 provisions (wb_tot_pr).
The first was originally included in Hofmann et al. (2017) and we
construct the second index for robustness purposes.
• The ‘core depth’ variable (wb_core), which follows and counts the to-
tal number of ‘core’ provisions that are included and legally enforceable
in a PTA.
34Retrievable from ww.rtais.wto.org.
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• The ‘PCA depth’ index (wb_pca) based on a principal-component
analysis (PCA) to obtain an index for the variability in the data.
Finally, we also create a dummy variable for the presence of a PTA (PTAwb),
with the value of one for those dyads where a PTA is present in the World
Bank database.
4.3.2 Additional economic integration indicators
The WTO’s Regional Trade Agreements Database is based on official mem-
ber state notifications.35 The WTO database is not in dyadic form, but it
has been converted to a dyadic form by some researchers, inter alia Mario
Larch Egger and Larch (2008), with an update in 2017. We use the lat-
ter as an alternative source of PTA classification and as additional bilat-
eral time-variant policy indicators. In particular, Mario Larch’s database
distinguishes between different degrees of trade integration: partial scope
agreements (PS), free-trade agreements (FTA), customs unions (CU) and
economic integration agreements (EIA). With two indicators that combine
these variables: CU and EIA, and FTA and EIA. Moreover Larch adds a
dummy indicator (RTA), which is equal to one if any one of PS, FTA, CU
or EIA is in place, and zero otherwise.
We also employ an indicator (dummy) variable for the existence of a
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) from the original UNCTAD data on
international investment agreements (UNCTAD, 2019). Moreover, we dis-
tinguish between BITs that have been signed and those that are effectively
in force.36 This provides additional depth to our analysis, and allows us to
test how important it is to legally enforce BITs to incentivise bilateral.
Finally, we link the FDI database with the CEPII database (Head et al.,
2010) to obtain additional control variables –to be used in the traditional
gravity regressions. These include variables such as distance, contiguity,
language, colonial past, and other dyadic variables.37
The simple correlations between the bilateral FDI stocks, the DESTA
PTA indicators and the additional policy variables are presented in Table
35It distinguishes between: free trade agreements (as defined in Paragraph 8b of Article
XXIV of GATT 1994), partial scope agreements (not defined in the WTO Agreement, but
notified under paragraph 4a of the Enabling Clause), custom unions (as defined in Para-
graph 8a of Article XXIV of GATT 1994), economic integration agreements (as defined
in Article V of GATS).
36We want to thank Valentino Desilvestro for sharing these data with us.
37We also use the average population-weighted domestic distances for those cases where
the origin and destination are the same.
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A.2 in the Appendix. It is interesting to observe that the correlation between
the DESTA PTA dummy and depth indicators and the other PTA indicators
(i.e. from the World Bank and WTO databases) are relatively high, with
values ranging between 0.65 and 0.85. However, the correlations are not as
high as to convene the same underlying information and thus, it provides a
good robustness tests to our main results using the DESTA database.
5 FDI gravity results
In this section we present our main empirical results based on the FDI
gravity model defined in Equation 1 using yearly bilateral FDI stock data
and the PTA indicators taken from the DESTA database.
5.1 Main results
In Table 2 we present the results of our preferred econometric specification
using country-pair fixed effects (Equation 4).38 Given the high correlation
between the PTA dummy and the PTA depth indicators (0.8) in Table A.2,
we do not regress both variables together. We observe that the DESTA
depth index has a positive and significant effect on inward FDI stocks, while
the PTA dummy variable (constructed using the DESTA database) is also
positive and significant.39 Moreover, the inclusion of a dummy variable to
identify country-pairs within the EU single-market, is also positive and sig-
nificant, and the magnitude of its effect is substantially larger than both of
the PTA indicators. The regressions reported in Table 2 use clustered stan-
dard errors by country pair, but the results appeared to robust to different
error specifications: robust standard errors, using the three-way (origin,
destination and time) clustering option for standard errors.40
— TABLE 2 around here —
In columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 we give the results of the specification
using the traditional gravity variables, where ln_DIST is the log of the
weighted distance indicator, CNTG is the contiguity dummy for countries
38To estimate the PPML regressions we use Zylkin’s STATA ado files (cf. Larch et al.,
2017), which provide a much faster estimation than the normal STATA command.
39Note that as shown by Fally (2015), using PPML in conjunction with country-time
and country-pair fixed effects generates a near-perfect fit of the data (i.e. R2 = 1). Thus,
this statistic is non-informative for our PPML estimates and we do not report it in any of
our regression results.
40The results of these robustness checks are available at request.
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that share a common border, LANG is the shared language dummy and
CLNY is the dummy that identifies a common coloniser after 1945. Here
we find that these variables have the expected sign, and both the PTA depth
and PTA dummy variables are again positive and significant, but with much
higher coefficient values. These last results suggests that not controlling for
non-observable time-invariant factors –as done when we use the country-
pair fixed effects in columns (1) to (4), over-estimates the impact of PTAs
on FDI flows. Hence, the country-pair fixed effect specification provides
more accurate estimated coefficients of the impact of PTAs on inward FDI
stocks.
The robustness of our results with this baseline regression was tested
by three variants that we show in Appendix A.2 (see Tables A.3 to A.5).
In these tables, the dependent variable is defined by, respectively, 2-year,
3-year and 4-year averages to check for the (Trefler, 2004) critique regarding
the implementation time of PTAs. In all specifications, however, the sign
and significance of our main explanatory variables is retained.
To facilitate the interpretation of the estimated regression parameters
for the policy variables using the PTA dummy and depth indicators from
DESTA, we translate them in a percentage effect on the dependent variable
(inward FDI), using the following formula:
V = (expγˆ − 1) ∗ 100 (6)
where V is the FDI effect (in percentages) of each individual indicator, with “ˆ
being the estimated coefficient by indicator. In Table 3 we present the result
for the PTA indicators when different depth values are used. Recall that the
DESTA database is ranked from one (shallow PTA) to seven (deepest PTA).
For instance, the implementation of the deepest PTA is estimated to increase
the bilateral inward FDI stock of the host country by approximately 35%,
while a shallow PTA (with DESTA index of one) will only increase bilateral
FDI by 4%.
— TABLE 3 around here —
However, the average estimated effect on bilateral FDI stocks of signing
a PTA is 31% when only a PTA dummy variable is used. This implies that
just signing a PTA, regardless of its depth, has a larger impact than signing
a PTA with a depth level below seven. In particular, much of the impact
of deep PTAs is driven by countries that belong to the EU single market.
The EU members account for around 70% of PTAs that will otherwise be
identified as ‘deep’ (with a DESTA index of seven). Hence, given that the
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EU single-market entails a much deeper integration than a PTA, we find
that it is crucial to include the EU single market dummy in our regressions.
This finding (depth of the PTA has no substantially different effect than
just signing a PTA) is corroborated when we regress independently each
PTA depth level and each PTA provision. These results are shown in Table
4. First, we observe that most depth levels are not significant when regressed
individually. Only PTAs with depth three and five have significant effects,
but they are well below the average impact of signing a PTA of any depth.
Moreover, PTAs of depth seven are only significant when the EU single
market is taken as a deep PTA.
— TABLE 4 around here —
On the other hand, when we individually regress each of the seven provi-
sions that constitute the DESTA depth index, we find that all provisions are
positive and significant. Moreover, the expected FDI effect of five of those
provisions ranges between 20 and 30%. Including IPR provisions has the
largest FDI effect (37%) and, remarkably, PTAs with investment provisions
generate the lowest FDI impact (15%). That all provisions are significant,
and with relatively similar estimated coefficients, suggests that no particu-
lar provision is responsible for promoting bilateral FDI. In addition, given
the inconclusive results by individual PTA depth levels, this also suggests
that the main factor generating additional bilateral FDI is the presence of
a PTA, irrespective of which provisions it includes.
When we frame these results with respect to our empirically testable
hypothesis, we find that the first two hypothesis are confirmed. Both the
presence of a PTA and the PTA depth index are increasing bilateral FDI,
through an increase in FDI openness and/or by reducing relative FDI friction
costs. However, our results reject the third testable hypothesis that deeper
PTAs (above the average of 3.7) have a statistically higher effect than just
signing an average depth PTA.
5.2 Assessing the FDI impact of BITs
We now analyse the impact of additional country-pair policy time-varying
indicators. First, we estimate the impact of having a bilateral investment
treaty (BIT). As explained before, we distinguish between signed BITs and
those that, in addition, are also in force.
Table 5 shows that BITs have a positive and significant impact on bi-
lateral FDI. When alone or in combination with the PTA indicators and/or
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the EU single market dummy, both signed and BITs and in-force BITs have
a higher effect than signing a PTA. As expected, BITs that are in force have
a higher impact –around 42% increase in bilateral FDI– than those that are
only signed (around 35%).
— TABLE 5 around here —
Moreover, the estimated impact values for the BITs and the PTA co-
efficients are quite similar when they are combined in the same regression.
This suggests that PTAs and BITs affect different FDI barriers, and thus,
have separate but positive effects on bilateral FDI. This is further confirmed
by the rather low correlations between the BITs and PTA indicators, at
around 0.15 (see Table A.2). By construction, the BITs are different from
trade agreements and, moreover, they also signal country-specific FDI in-
vestment risks. BITs are set to guarantee private investments from one
country into another by means of different instruments, such as protection
from expropriation, free transfer of means, fair and equitable treatment, for-
eign investors fair and equitable, non-discriminatory, most-favoured-nation
and national treatment, and sometimes the use of investor-state dispute set-
tlement (ISDS) mechanisms (cf. UNCTAD, 2007). In this regard, a core
objective of BITs is to reduce the investment risks of FDI by establishing
transparency about what those risks are in a particular country (Bergstrand
and Egger, 2013). BITs are more likely to be established when countries
want to protect firms investing in countries that are considered to be risky.
Such motivation is hardly required for protecting North-North investment,
when the national legal systems usually provide enough protection for firms
with FDI. For example, the USA had BIT agreements with many Eastern
European countries before their EU accession, but do not have BITs with
their main trading partners (e.g. old EU members, Canada, China, Japan
and Mexico.)
These positive results regarding the effect of BITs have been also found
in (e.g. Bergstrand and Egger, 2013). Our results, however, do not support
the claim by Haftel (2010) that only BITs in force (i.e. mutually ratified)
would have a positive effect on FDI inflows, whereas agreements that are
not in force (only signed) would have little effect.
5.3 Estimating the FDI impact of other economic integration
indicators
In this section we run a second set of regressions using alternative country-
pair time-varying policy instruments. Table 6 shows our regression re-
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sults when using the economic integration indicators taken from the WTO
database.41
— TABLE 6 around here —
We find the presence of a free trade agreement (‘FTA’ in Table 6) has
a positive and significant effect on FDI inflows. However, the magnitude
of the effect is lower than using the PTA DESTA dummy variable. In
general, we find that all economic integration indicators are positive and
significant. However, the most interesting result is that the customs union
(CU) indicator has by far the largest effect (93%), also when it is combined
with a free trade agreement (98%). On the other hand, it is surprising that
the partial scope (PS) has a larger effect than the FTA.
Nevertheless, these results seem to be conditional on the treatment of the
EU single market. As we mentioned before, membership to the EU single
market entitles a broad set of common policies that when taken together,
represent deep integration mechanisms. Hence, even though the EU can be
separately qualified as a customs union, a trade agreement and an economic
integration agreement, in reality it encompasses all three elements. In reality
is also includes other institutions –such as shared regulations and the legal
superposition of European Court of Justice– that makes it puts it in a much
deeper integration level than the WTO-based classifications. In this regard,
when treating the EU only as a customs union, the estimated coefficient can
be biased given that the EU single market also accounts for other integration
policies.
Based on this we run a separate set of regressions where we separately
account for the EU single market. These results are shown on the bottom-
half of Table 6. We find that controlling for the EU single market, the CU
indicator is no longer significant. The previous results was clearly driven
by accounting EU membership solely as a customs union, where two-thirds
of the CU observations where EU country-pairs. However, the other inte-
gration indicators remain significant. Even the CU & EIA indicator, even
though 94% of the observations for this indicator where EU country-pairs.
6 Sensitivity estimations
To analyse the robustness of our results to different specification, we run a
series of sensitivity tests, which are explained below. Note however, that we
41The definition and construction of these indicators is explained in Section 4.3.2.
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already ran some sensitivity analysis. First, using different yearly averages
for inward FDI (2-year, 3-year and 4-year averages) and second, we employed
different standard error specifications in the PPML regressions.
6.1 Using the World Bank’s depth indicators
In Table A.6 in Appendix A.2 we present the regression results using the
constructed PTA indicators from the World Bank PTA depth database (Hof-
mann et al., 2017). We find that all these PTA indicators are significant
when we use the country-pair fixed effect specification and also when we
identify country-pairs that belong to the EU single market. Thus, we find
that PTAs and different combinations of the 52 provisions included in the
World Bank database also generate positive and significant bilateral FDI
effects.
The level of detail in this database –which includes 52 provisions that also
vary by legal enforceability– makes it non-practical to do detailed provision-
specific analysis. It is also difficult to identify an ‘average’ PTA depth for
testing our third hypothesis –i.e. deep PTAs have a larger impact than
average PTAs. To approximate some average PTA depth we use the ‘core
depth’ variable (wb_core) that counts the total number of ‘core’ provisions
that are included and legally enforceable in a PTA. We compare its impact on
bilateral FDI with that of a simple PTA dummy for the presence of a PTA
(also based on the same database). The conclusion is that the estimated
impact of the PTA dummy is much larger than the estimated impact of
the wb_core indicator. Remarkably, because it suggests that just signing
a PTA (irrespective of the number of provisions) has a much larger effect
than including what are considered the ‘core’ provisions in PTAs. Hence,
this result also reinforces our conclusion that the presence of a PTA has the
same or similar effects than signing a ‘deep’ PTA.42
6.2 Excluding domestic stocks
We estimate our main specifications excluding the ‘domestic inward’ stocks
taken as the country’s capital stock data. Recall that we used this speci-
fication in our main estimations because of the large relative weight of do-
mestic (versus border-crossing) investment, which suggests that barriers to
border-crossing FDI are very important. It is therefore interesting to know
42The same results hold (cf. A.6) for the comparison with other depth indices (e.g.
wb_tot_pr and wb_pca).
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what happens when these large relative weights in the world FDI matrix are
dropped.
In Table A.7 in the Appendix we present the results. As expected, we
find that the coefficients from the structural gravity equations are completely
different from those obtained when we control for the domestic investment
stocks. Importantly, we observe that the PTA and the BITs indicators are
no longer significant using this specification, while the PTA indicators now
have a negative sign. Only the EU single market dummy remains positive
and significant.43
These results highlight the importance of controlling for domestic capi-
tal stocks in the gravity estimations as explained in the best-practices taken
from Yotov et al. (2016). In particular, using domestic capital stocks we can
control for the effects of non-discriminatory trade policy, allow for consis-
tently identifying the effects of PTAs and other bilateral trade policies, and
obtain a bias-free estimation of the effects of PTAs on FDI inward stocks.
6.3 Excluding tax havens
As explained above, bilateral FDI data is fraught with measurement and
compilation issues. One of these problems is created by tax havens and coun-
tries that re-route FDI flows (cf. Beugelsdijk et al., 2010; Damgaard et al.,
2019). In this section we test the robustness of our main results by exclud-
ing these countries from our sample. In particular, we exclude the following
countries: Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Island, Cyprus, Hong
Kong, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, Panama,
Singapore, and British Virgin Islands. The results excluding these countries
from our sample are presented in Table A.8. We find that compared to our
main specification, the results are less robust. The PTA depth index is no
longer significant, but the presence of a PTA remain significant and positive,
although with a lower coefficient. Moreover, the EU single market and BITs
that are in force also remain significant.
It can be argued that some of these countries –although they might be
creating measurement issues with the FDI data– can also be considered as
genuine FDI destinations. For instance, when we do not exclude Hong Kong
and Singapore from the main sample, the PTA depth coefficient becomes
significant and the value of the PTA dummy coefficient increases to a level
similar to the one in our main specification. Therefore, excluding these two
countries confirms that the PTA depth indicator is not robust, but our other
43The results are very similar when using other combinations between the PTA indica-
tors, the EU single market and both BIT indicators.
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variables –the presence of a PTA, the EU single market and the presence of
enforceable BITs– do remain significant and robust.
6.4 Using FDI flow data instead of stock data
The UNCTAD Bilateral FDI database also provides data on FDI inflows
and outflows.44 We then use these FDI inflow data in our main econometric
specification using the yearly data but also average FDI inflows for 3- and
4- year periods. We find that the PTA indicators are only significant when
using the 4-year average FDI inflows. The results are shown in Table A.9
in the Appendix. Overall, the EU single market dummy is positive and
significant, and the BITs that are in force are significant in the yearly data
and the 4-year averages, but not with 3-year averages. However, the BITs
that are only signed, are not significant using any of these specifications
(results not shown).
These results can be explained by the large volatility of FDI flows, which
may fluctuate substantially between years. In addition, the incidence of neg-
ative values for FDI inflows is more pronounced than for FDI inward stocks:
13% of the FDI flow data has negative values. Thus, only using averages of
several years can smooth these FDI inflow fluctuations and partially correct
for the negative FDI flow values. However, when using multi-year averages,
there is an additional complication regarding the exact timing of the shock
and how it affects FDI. As we see in the next section, there are significant
lags and lead effects, and this complicates the identification of the policy
shock when using multi-year FDI averages.
6.5 PTA dynamics: role of leads and lags
As the last sensitivity test, we run our main specification using lagged and
lead values for our PTA indicators. The intuition is that the specific impact
of an PTA can happen some years before or after the agreement enters into
force. In other words, signing the PTA can have anticipatory or lagged
effects on bilateral FDI. Table A.10 in the Appendix presents the results
when we run our main specification using one to three lags and one to three
leads (forward in time). In all regressions we include the EU single market
dummy.
44When using FDI flows as our dependent variable, we then employ the World Bank’s
WDI data on gross fixed capital formation (GFKF) to account for the domestic investment
flows.
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We find that a PTA has an effect on inward FDI stocks already three
years before and up-to three years after signing the agreement. In particular,
all our lagged and lead variables yield a positive and significant coefficient
for both the PTA dummy and the PTA depth variable. We obtain the same
results when we use the PTA dummy variable. The effects are of a similar
magnitude but slightly higher one year before (L1) and one year after (F1)
the PTA has been implemented. This suggests the presence of both an
anticipatory and a lagged FDI adjustments to PTAs.
7 Conclusions
Our structural gravity methodology allows us to estimate the expected
changes in bilateral FDI by looking into the past experience for similar PTA
treaties and other country-pair policies. To account for the heterogenous
nature of PTAs, we rely on several PTA indicators but our main results
employ the DESTA database. The first contribution of our paper is that
we find robust empirical evidence that implementing a PTA has a positive
effect on FDI inflows and inward stocks, even when the primary purpose of
such agreements is to increase bilateral trade between the signing partners.
These results are thus reflecting the increased importance of vertical FDI
associated with the trade-FDI networks in global value chains, where trade
and FDI complement and are positively correlated with each other.
We also find that the composition of the PTA agreement –proxied by the
presence of different provisions– is not empirically important when account-
ing for the PTA effects on bilateral FDI. For instance, when all provisions
included in the DESTA PTA depth index –full tariff reduction, standards,
services, competition, procurement, investment and IPRs– are individually
regressed, we find that all have positive and significant effects on bilateral
FDI. Thus, combining specific provisions in a PTA does not generate sig-
nificantly different FDI changes. Surprisingly, the investment provision has
the lowest impact of all.
In addition, even though we find that the coefficient of the PTA depth
index is positive and significant, we also find that the effect of deeper PTAs
is not robust. For example, when each PTA depth level is regressed individ-
ually, only two out of the seven depth levels are significant. In particular,
we find it crucial to control for membership of the EU single market and
not classifying these country-pairs has having a deep PTA. Indeed, the Eu-
ropean single market entails a much deeper and comprehensive framework
for economic integration, which we find to have a substantially higher ef-
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fect on bilateral FDI (i.e. 135%) than any average trade agreement (31%).
Moreover, we also find that the presence of a BIT also has a positive and
significant effect on bilateral FDI. Those BITs that are legally in force have
a larger effect, but even BITs that are signed but not enforced also have an
effect that is similar in magnitude to that of signing a PTA.
Our main results are robust to the use of different policy variables and
empirical specifications. For instance, when employing alternative PTA
databases and integration policy indicators, lagged and lead effects, and
when excluding countries considered to be tax havens.
Last but not least, the empirical results of this paper are in line with
what could be expected on the basis of our partial-equilibrium model for
explaining bilateral FDI. Therefore, we think that our model meets the
challenge framed by Blonigen (2005) and can function as a valuable new
tool for empirical analysis of FDI. Moreover, the empirical results of this
model can by used as valuable inputs for larger applied general equilibrium
models that assess welfare issues related to FDI.
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8 Figures and tables
Figure 1: PTA presence and depth between 2001 and 2012
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Table 1: Main characteristics for the presence and depth of PTAs between
2001 and 2012
Country-pairs
All observations Country-pairs 1/ with EU as partner
share share share
total share (%) if total share (%) if total share (%) if
With: (%) PTA=1 (%) PTA=1 (%) PTA=1
No PTA 67,780 64.9 5,183 61.0 2,410 51.6
PTA (dummy = 1) 36,680 35.1 3,320 39.0 2,263 48.4
PTA Depth = 1 10,373 9.9 28.3 438 5.2 13.2 210 4.5 9.3
PTA Depth = 2 6,030 5.8 16.4 556 6.5 16.7 139 3.0 6.1
PTA Depth = 3 4,095 3.9 11.2 785 9.2 23.6 669 14.3 29.6
PTA Depth = 4 2,035 1.9 5.5 210 2.5 6.3 145 3.1 6.4
PTA Depth = 5 2,721 2.6 7.4 203 2.4 6.1 141 3.0 6.2
PTA Depth = 6 1,176 1.1 3.2 163 1.9 4.9 35 0.7 1.5
PTA Depth = 7 10,250 9.8 27.9 965 11.3 29.1 924 19.8 40.8
EU - single market 6,570 6.3 17.9 693 8.2 20.9 693 14.8 20.9
Depth=7, excl. EU-sm 3,680 3.5 10.0 272 3.2 8.2 231 4.9 20.0
Total 104,460 100.0 100.0 8,503 100.0 100.0 4,673 100.0 100.0
Notes: 1/ Excluding same country pairs. Sources: Own estimations using DESTA
database.
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Table 2: Main FDI gravity regressions using yearly inward FDI stocks
eq. 4: country-pair FE eq. 5: standard gravity
variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PTA depth 0.051*** 0.043** 0.191***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.032)
PTA dummy 0.279*** 0.272*** 0.411**
(0.062) (0.063) (0.166)
EU single market 0.854*** 0.666*** 1.029*** 0.228
(0.105) (0.083) (0.241) (0.181)
log(Distance) -0.413*** -0.574***
(0.102) (0.112)
Common border 0.488* 0.611***
(0.258) (0.229)
Common language 1.224*** 1.297***
(0.159) (0.146)
Colonial ties 3.016*** 3.185***
(0.177) (0.173)
Observations 75,228 75,228 75,228 75,228 77,512 77,512
Notes: Dependent variable: FDI inward stocks. PPML estimations using country-pair
clustering of standard errors, in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Origin-
country-time (µit), destination-country-time (µjt), and country-par (µij) fixed effects are
not reported. PTA_dummy and PTA_depth are taken from the DESTA database.
Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI and CEPII databases.
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Table 3: Expected PTA impact on FDI by presence and value of PTA depth
indicator
Policy estimated FDI effect
variable: coefficient (percentage)
PTA presence (dummy) 0.272 31.3
DESTA depth index
depth=1 0.043 4.4
depth=2 0.086 9.0
depth=3 0.129 13.8
depth=4 0.172 18.8
depth=5 0.215 24.0
depth=6 0.258 29.4
depth=7 0.301 35.1
EU single market 0.854 134.9
Notes: Values taken from Table 2. Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral
FDI, DESTA and CEPII databases.
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Table 4: Individually estimated coefficients for specific PTA depth levels
and specific provisions
estimated significance FDI effect
coefficient levels (percentage)
PTA depth level:
depth=1 0.112
depth=2 0.102
depth=3 0.213 *** 23.7
depth=4 -0.081
depth=5 0.139 * 14.9
depth=6 0.107
depth=7 0.239 ** 27.0
depth=7 & non-EU \1 0.060
PTA provisions:
Full tariffs 0.248 *** 28.1
Standards 0.224 *** 25.1
Competition 0.192 *** 21.2
Services 0.258 *** 29.4
Procurement 0.207 ** 23.0
Investments 0.140 * 15.0
IPRs 0.314 *** 36.9
Notes: All coefficients are estimated using Equation (4) with yearly FDI dat. \1 Here
we only account for PTAs with depth level seven that do not include EU single market
country-pairs. Source: Own estimations using the UNCTAD bilateral FDI and the DESTA
databases.
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Table 5: FDI gravity regressions using yearly inward FDI stocks and BITs
indicators
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BIT signed 0.265*** 0.306*** 0.304***
(0.094) (0.090) (0.090)
BIT in force 0.336*** 0.373*** 0.361***
(0.090) (0.0911) (0.0893)
PTA_depth 0.043** 0.043**
(0.017) (0.0170)
PTA_dummy 0.272*** 0.271***
(0.063) (0.0627)
EU single market 0.866*** 0.678*** 0.869*** 0.679***
(0.105) (0.084) (0.105) (0.0838)
Observations 75,228 75,228 75,228 75,228 75,228 75,228
Notes: Dependent variable: FDI inward stocks. PPML estimations using country-pair
clustering of standard errors, in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Origin-
country-time (µit), destination-country-time (µjt), and country-par (µij) fixed effects are
not reported. Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI and BITs databases.
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Table 6: Estimated coefficients using yearly inward FDI stocks for alterna-
tive economic integration indicators
estimated significance FDI effect
coefficient levels (percentage)
WTO-based indicators: 1\
Customs Union (CU) 0.658 *** 93.1
Free trade agreement (FTA) 0.128 ** 13.7
Economic Integration Agreement (EIA) 0.263 *** 30.1
Partial scope agreement (PS) 0.208 * 23.1
CU & EIA 0.681 *** 97.6
FTA & EIA 0.122 * 13.0
RTA \1 0.251 *** 28.5
Accounting separately for the EU single market: \2
Customs Union (CU) -0.015
Free trade agreement (FTA) 0.263 *** 30.1
Economic Integration Agreement (EIA) 0.248 *** 28.1
Partial scope agreement (PS) 0.207 * 23.0
CU & EIA 0.632 ** 88.1
FTA & EIA 0.247 *** 28.0
RTA \1 0.250 *** 28.4
Notes: \1 Taken from the updated version of the database from Egger and Larch (2008).
RTA=1 if any one of CU, FTA, EIA or PS is in place, and 0 otherwise. 2\ These
indicators treat the EU single market separately from these categories. In each of these
regressions the EU single market dummy is included (but not reported). Source: Own
estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI data.
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A Appendix
A.1 Deriving the FDI gravity model
This annex derives the partial-equilibrium structural gravity model for FDI
that we use in Section 3.1. Our objective is to aim for the simplest possible
model, avoiding less essential complications. This is done in three stages.
First, we analyse FDI by country pair in a friction-free world. In the second
stage we introduce absolute FDI frictions. In the last stage we translate the
results to a n-country world where also relative FDI friction costs matter.
The model is based on the knowledge-capital interpretation of FDI,
where firms in country i have proprietary knowledge (Mit) that can be used
on a non-rival basis in several locations at time t. In this setting M is re-
garded as FDI if the knowledge asset is applied in another country, under
full or partial control of the owning firm. Assuming that all proprietary
knowledge assets of all k domestic firms can simply be aggregated to the na-
tional stock of knowledge capital, so that Mit =
q
k Mitk. Larger and richer
countries have more firms, and can invest more in the development of unique
knowledge assets through firm-level and public institutions. We therefore
assume that the national knowledge-capital stock is linearly proportional to
current and past GDP:
Mit = –iYit + Mit−1 (7)
in which –i < 1 is the proportionality factor with respect to the country’s
current economic mass (measured as GDP), while Mit−1 represents the cu-
mulative knowledge stock from the past. If proprietary knowledge assets
can somehow be protected and preserved, the use of the knowledge asset is
non-rival. Firms are willing to ‘lease’ their proprietary knowledge asset to
other countries in the form of FDI. To keep the model as simple as possible,
we set the lagged component of national knowledge capital to zero, so that
in a given year t country i will be prepared to supply FDI volume equal to
–iYit.
Consumers and firms have a preference for variety in their use of knowledge-
capital assets, because they value foreign technologies, product designs and
management methods. For any country j, this generates a positive demand-
pull for FDI. The size of this pull force is also proportional to the size of
their economy —jYjt, because larger countries tend to have more firms, more
consumers, and a more complex set of intermediary industries. In a friction-
free world, the FDI push and pull forces generate a combined amount of
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bilateral FDI between each country pair:
FDInofricijt = –iYit—jYjt (8)
The free flow of FDI is hampered as soon as we introduce absolute FDI
frictions. Legal or statutory barriers to bilateral FDI represent a major
source of absolute FDI frictions. On the side of the FDI-receiving country j
such access restrictions are represented by Âjit. This may include red-tape
barriers in the form of total FDI bans, negative lists that specify restrictions
to the activity of multinationals in specific industries, protection of national
champions, or any other access-related policy measures. Moreover, the FDI
origin country i could also use outflow restrictions Âijt, e.g. when govern-
ments or firms define strategic or commercial knowledge assets that may not
be transferred to country j via FDI.45 Both factors diminish bilateral FDI:
FDIaccessijt =
FDInofricijt
(1 + Âjit)(1 + Âijt)
(9)
If we further assume –without loss of generality– that all origin countries
share the same –, that all destination countries have the same —, and that
„ijt indexes the combined absolute bilateral FDI frictions of the origin and
destination country, then we have:
FDIaccessijt =
–Yit—Yjt
„ijt
(10)
FDIaccessijt represents the amount of FDI that country i would invest in
country j in a world with only access-restricting (absolute) FDI frictions.
However, the opportunity costs of investing in other countries plays no role
in Equation 10. We now drop the latter condition. Relative FDI frictions can
have many forms, but they all affect the opportunity costs of operating in a
particular country versus operating in any other country. This may include
various operational costs, such as distance (transport), infrastructure, com-
munication (language differences), legal system (enforceability of contracts),
government characteristics (efficiency, degree of business-mindedness, sta-
bility, corruption), labour quality and labour costs, corporate tax rate, and
security conditions (affecting insurance and contingency costs). These are
the elements that multinational firms typically evaluate before locating their
operations in a particular country.
45Such bans may also be applied to proprietary knowledge assets when the destination
country has the reputation that it does not respect or enforce intellectual property rights.
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The absolute FDI frictions dominate and precede the relative FDI fric-
tion, by setting the negative constraints that frame the possibilities for FDI
location choice. After that, multinational firms choose their locations on the
basis of relative FDI frictions and/or market size. Let zijt be an index of the
operating costs of FDI that firms from country i would have when investing
in destination country j. zijt is then compared to other costs that multina-
tionals have in all other countries, including their home country. Both these
elements are consistently quantified by the so-called multilateral resistance
(MR) terms. When viewed from the perspective of the FDI origin country
i, the aggregator Pit gives the average of relative FDI friction costs in all
possible destination countries (including the home country), weighted by the
relative size of each economy:
Pit =
S
U Nÿ
j=1
A
zijt
Πjt
B(1−σ)
Yjt
Yt
T
V
1
1−σ
(11)
The bilateral costs zijt are normalised with Πjt, an index for the average
FDI friction cost, to be discussed below. The second factor is the size of
country j’s economy, as measured by its relative economic mass (
Yjt
Yt
), where
Yt =
q
Yjt is world GDP. Finally, the inward multilateral resistance term
Pit uses the constant elasticity of substitution ‡ for a consistent aggregation
and averaging of all national FDI friction costs, after weighing them by the
relative economic size of each country. Recapitulating, Pit is the index that
gives the average (relative) friction costs that each firm from country i has
when doing FDI, and after correcting for the size of each destination country.
This index is important because it guides the FDI location choices of firms.
The combination of relative friction costs and market size decides whether
a country is a preferred FDI location. This may vary by year. If
zijt
Πjt
<1, the
relative FDI friction costs are less than average and may not form an ob-
stacle, but in the opposite case they form an obstacle for bilateral FDI. The
second factor is the size of country j’s economy, as measured by its relative
economic mass (
Yjt
Yt
). The combination of both elements decides whether
a country is a preferred FDI location. A good score on one element may
compensate a bad score on the other element. Countries that have the com-
bination of a small economy (Yjt/Y¯t < 1) and relatively high FDI friction
costs may expect the least FDI, while most FDI will go to large countries
with relatively low FDI friction costs.
The structural gravity model also accounts for differences in the policy-
related and geographical characteristics of each FDI origin. The latter may
affect the costs of FDI and the willingness of national firms to engage in
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outward direct investment projects. Because the gravity model is all about
the proportionality between economic mass and the intensity of cross-border
FDI transactions, we must also account for such frictional (disturbance)
factors. The full FDI gravity system therefore also holds the term Πjt for the
outward MR terms, i.e. the relative outward FDI friction costs of FDI origin
countries that potentially invest in country j, weighted by the relative size of
the origin countries. Analogue to Equation 11, Πjt consistently aggregates
the average outward MR for all (potential) origin countries, after accounting
for differences in country size:
Πjt =
C
Nÿ
i=1
3
zjit
Pit
4(1−σ) Yit
Yt
D 1
1−σ
(12)
Mirroring Equation 11, country i’s average inward MR terms Pit is used
here to normalise the outward bilateral friction costs zjit.
Recall that Equation 10 yielded FDIaccessijt , the amount of FDI that
country i would invest in country j in a world with only absolute (access-
restricting) FDI frictions. After elaborating the inward and outward MR
terms we now move to the third stage of our analysis. Here we derive the full
equation for bilateral FDI in a n-country world where relative FDI frictions
also matter for FDI decisions. The friction-free FDI-push factor –Yit must
be now corrected for the inward friction costs that firms from country i
encounter on average in its destination countries (Pit). These frictions lower
the amount of outward FDI per unit of country i’s GDP. Thus, the corrected
FDI-push factor becomes: αYit
Pit
. Something similar holds for the FDI-pull
factor coming from the destination countries (—jYjt). The average outward
friction costs for their incoming FDI is given by Πjt. This can be regarded as
the expected average FDI acquisition costs that country j ‘incurs’ to attract
knowledge-capital FDI. The corrected FDI-demand pull then reduces to:
βYjt
Πjt
. We may now derive the full equation for bilateral FDI:
FDIstockijt = Êijt
–Yit
Pit
—Yjt
Πjt
(13)
where 0 ≤ Êijt ≤ 1 is the FDI openness indicator, the inverse of the param-
eter „ijt for bilateral FDI access restrictions. With Equation 13 we have
derived Equation 1 in the main text.
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A.2 Additional tables
Table A.1: Most frequent provisions by PTA depth level
Most frequent PTA provision combination
With: First share (%) Second share (%) Third share (%)
PTA Depth = 1 Standards 69.8 Full tariffs 23.3 Services 5.8
PTA Depth = 2 Full tariffs + 94.9 Investment + 1.3 Full tariffs + 1.2
standards Services Services
PTA Depth = 3 Investment + 29.3 Full tariffs + 15.4 Full tariffs + 14.7
Services + Standards + Standards +
Competition IPRs Procurement
PTA Depth = 4 Full tariffs + 79.8 Full tariffs + 6.5 Full tariffs + 5.0
Standards + Standards + Standards +
Services + Services + Investment +
Competition Procurement Competition
PTA Depth = 5 All except: 40.9 All except: 26.6 All except: 23.9
Investment + Procurement + Investment +
IPRs IPRs Competition
PTA Depth = 6 All except: 43.6 All except: 36.6 All except: 15.8
IPRs Competition Procurement
Sources: Own estimations using DESTA database.
Table A.2: Correlations between main policy variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 FDI stocks 1
2 PTA_depth 0.10 1
3 PTA_dummy 0.06 0.80 1
4 EU single market -0.01 0.68 0.40 1
5 WB_pta_dummy 0.07 0.77 0.72 0.46 1
6 WB_tot_le 0.14 0.86 0.62 0.64 0.81 1
7 WB_tot_pr 0.12 0.84 0.66 0.54 0.88 0.94 1
8 WB_core 0.09 0.84 0.70 0.54 0.95 0.90 0.96 1
9 WB_pca 0.10 0.86 0.66 0.65 0.88 0.95 0.99 0.96 1
10 WTO FTA_dummy 0.07 0.74 0.69 0.44 0.81 0.67 0.72 0.78 0.72 1
11 WTO RTA_dummy 0.05 0.68 0.82 0.35 0.72 0.58 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.76 1
12 BIT signed 0.04 0.13 0.13 0.03 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 1
13 BITs in-force 0.05 0.17 0.15 0.07 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.89
Source: UNCTAD bilateral FDI, DESTA, World Bank and WTO databases.
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Table A.3: FDI gravity regressions using 2-year average inward FDI stocks
eq. 4: country-pair FE eq. 5: standard gravity
variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PTA depth 0.060*** 0.052*** 0.195***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.033)
PTA dummy 0.277*** 0.269*** 0.417**
(0.058) (0.059) (0.163)
EU single market 0.873*** 0.650*** 1.078*** 0.249
(0.107) (0.083) (0.233) (0.168)
log(Distance) -0.400*** -0.572***
(0.0991) (0.109)
Common border 0.503* 0.615***
(0.258) (0.229)
Common language 1.234*** 1.299***
(0.160) (0.146)
Colonial ties 2.953*** 3.167***
(0.187) (0.175)
Observations 38,319 38,319 38,319 38,319 39,647 39,647
Notes: Dependent variable: FDI inward stocks, using 2-year averages. PPML estimations
using country-pair clustering of standard errors, in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Origin-country-time (µit), destination-country-time (µjt), and country-par (µij)
fixed effects are not reported. PTA_dummy and PTA_depth are taken from the DESTA
database. Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI and CEPII databases.
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Table A.4: FDI gravity regressions using 3-year average FDI inward stock
data
eq. 4: country-pair FE eq. 5: standard gravity
variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PTA depth 0.060*** 0.053*** 0.207***
(0.020) (0.019) (0.033)
PTA dummy 0.253*** 0.251*** 0.444***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.168)
EU single market 0.884*** 0.659*** 1.095*** 0.223
(0.110) (0.085) (0.230) (0.169)
log(Distance) -0.388*** -0.575***
(0.0997) (0.110)
Common border 0.489* 0.604***
(0.255) (0.224)
Common language 1.230*** 1.298***
(0.160) (0.145)
Colonial ties 2.920*** 3.150***
(0.190) (0.175)
Observations 26,317 26,317 26,317 26,317 27,285 27,285
Notes: Dependent variable: FDI inward stocks, using 3-year averages. PPML estimations
using country-pair clustering of standard errors, in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Origin-country-time (µit), destination-country-time (µjt), and country-par (µij)
fixed effects are not reported. PTA_dummy and PTA_depth are taken from the DESTA
database. Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI and CEPII databases.
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Table A.5: FDI gravity regressions using 4-year average inward FDI stocks
eq. 4: country-pair FE eq. 5: standard gravity
variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PTA depth 0.073*** 0.066*** 0.205***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.033)
PTA dummy 0.274*** 0.265*** 0.472***
(0.061) (0.062) (0.164)
EU single market 0.892*** 0.615*** 1.108*** 0.230
(0.117) (0.084) (0.231) (0.168)
log(Distance) -0.383*** -0.567***
(0.099) (0.109)
Common border 0.516** 0.607***
(0.259) (0.229)
Common language 1.222*** 1.288***
(0.161) (0.147)
Colonial ties 2.930*** 3.163***
(0.191) (0.174)
Observations 19,519 19,519 19,519 19,519 20,340 20,340
Notes: Dependent variable: FDI inward stocks, using 4-year averages. PPML estimations
using country-pair clustering of standard errors, in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Origin-country-time (µit), destination-country-time (µjt), and country-par (µij)
fixed effects are not reported. PTA_dummy and PTA_depth are taken from the DESTA
database. Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI and CEPII databases.
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Table A.6: FDI gravity regressions using yearly inward FDI stocks and the
PTA indicators from the World Bank database
variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
wb_pta_dummy 0.346*** 0.316***
(0.058) (0.062)
wb_tot_le 0.024*** 0.041***
(0.005) (0.010)
wb_tot_pr 0.022*** 0.026***
(0.004) (0.006)
wb_core 0.026*** 0.023***
(0.006) (0.007)
wb_pca 0.145*** 0.168***
(0.028) (0.045)
EU single market 0.418*** -0.646* -0.150 0.349*** -0.154
(0.097) (0.359) (0.196) (0.132) (0.243)
Observations 75,228 75,228 75,228 75,228 75,228 75,228 75,228 75,228 75,228 75,228
Notes: Dependent variable: yearly FDI inward stocks. PPML estimations using country-
pair clustering of standard errors, in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Origin-country-time (µit), destination-country-time (µjt), and country-par (µij) fixed ef-
fects are not reported. The P T A_wb dummy and the PTA depth indicators (wb_tot_le,
wb_tot_pr, wb_core, and wb_pca) are explained in Section 4.3.1. Source: Own estima-
tions using UNCTAD bilateral FDI and World Bank databases.
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Table A.7: FDI gravity regressions using yearly inward FDI stocks, with
and without domestic investment stocks
Excluding domestic
Main specification investment stocks
variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
PTA depth 0.043** -0.002
(0.017) (0.010)
PTA dummy 0.272*** -0.076
(0.063) (0.049)
EU single market 0.866*** 0.678*** 0.170* 0.184*
(0.105) (0.084) (0.102) (0.098)
BIT signed 0.306*** 0.304*** 0.0241 0.020
(0.090) (0.090) (0.052) (0.051)
Observations 75,228 75,228 72,739 72,739
Notes: Dependent variable: FDI inward stocks. PPML estimations using country-pair
clustering of standard errors, in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Origin-
country-time (µit), destination-country-time (µjt), and country-par (µij) fixed effects
are not reported. Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI and DESTA
databases.
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Table A.8: FDI gravity regressions using yearly inward FDI stocks and
excluding countries that are a classified as tax havens
Excluding domestic
Main specification investment stocks
variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
PTA depth 0.043** 0.028
(0.017) (0.018)
PTA dummy 0.272*** 0.140*
(0.063) (0.080)
EU single market 0.866*** 0.678*** 0.761*** 0.643***
(0.105) (0.084) (0.108) (0.084)
BIT signed 0.306*** 0.304*** 0.279*** 0.277***
(0.090) (0.090) (0.097) (0.096)
Observations 75,228 75,228 59,506 59,506
Notes: Dependent variable: yearly inward FDI stocks. PML estimations using country-
pair clustering of standard errors, in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Origin-
country-time (µit), destination-country-time (µjt), and country-par (µij) fixed effects
are not reported. Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI and DESTA
databases.
Table A.9: FDI gravity regressions using FDI inflows for yearly data and
different year averages
3-year average 4-year average
Yearly FDI stocks FDI stocks FDI stocks
variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PTA depth 0.012 -0.014 0.045***
(0.030) (0.013) (0.011)
PTA dummy 0.085 -0.01 0.094**
(0.134) (0.085) (0.044)
EU single market 0.678*** 0.712*** 0.427** 0.484*** 0.136* 0.059
(0.178) (0.185) (0.184) (0.182) (0.073) (0.075)
BIT in force 0.652*** 0.652*** 0.248 0.247 0.199*** 0.193***
(0.230) (0.230) (0.159) (0.159) (0.066) (0.066)
Observations 72,991 72,991 19,951 19,951 12,501 12,501
Notes: Dependent variable: FDI inflows. PML estimations using country-pair clustering
of standard errors, in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Origin-country-time
(µit), destination-country-time (µjt), and country-par (µij) fixed effects are not reported.
Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI, WDI and DESTA databases.
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Table A.10: FDI gravity regressions using yearly inward FDI stocks with
lags and leads
estimated significance FDI effect
coefficient levels (percentage)
PTA dummy:
Lagged 1 year 0.250 *** 28.4
Lagged 2 years 0.199 *** 22.0
Lagged 3 years 0.146 *** 15.7
Forward 1 year 0.280 *** 32.3
Forward 2 years 0.261 *** 29.8
Forward 3 years 0.284 *** 32.8
PTA depth:
Lagged 1 year 0.039 ** 4.0
Lagged 2 years 0.035 ** 3.5
Lagged 3 years 0.033 ** 3.3
Forward 1 year 0.038 *** 3.9
Forward 2 years 0.040 *** 4.1
Forward 3 years 0.032 *** 3.2
Notes: Dependent variable: yearly FDI inward stocks. PPML estimations using country-
pair clustering of standard errors, in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Origin-
country-time (µit), destination-country-time (µjt), and country-par (µij) fixed effects are
not reported. EU single market dummy included in all regressions.
Source: Own estimations using UNCTAD bilateral FDI and DESTA databases.
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